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Future-Proofing Japan’s Interests in the Arctic: 
Scientific Collaboration and a Search for Balance
Aki Tonami
I n May 2013 the Arctic states convened in Kiruna, Sweden, in part to decide on whether six new states should be admitted as observers to the 
Arctic Council. Japan’s application was accepted along with those of China, 
India, Italy, Singapore, and South Korea. At a glance, one might ask what 
credentials Japan has to be involved in the leading Arctic forum. However, 
a closer look at its engagement in the Arctic indicates that Japan has 
genuine interests in political, economic, and environmental developments 
there. This essay examines Japan’s interests in the Arctic, its new role as an 
observer to the Arctic Council, and the international relationships that will 
affect Japan’s engagement in the region.
Japan’s Current Engagement in the Arctic
Japan is no newcomer to the Arctic. Already in 1925, the country became 
one of the fourteen high-contracting parties to the Spitsbergen Treaty, 
which recognizes the sovereignty of Norway over the Arctic archipelago of 
Svalbard. In 1990, Japan formally joined the Arctic research community by 
becoming a member of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) 
as a non-Arctic state. In the same year, the Centre for Arctic Research at the 
National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) was established in Japan. 
According to the Japanese government, the country’s primary aim 
of engagement in the Arctic has been and remains understanding and 
protecting the natural environment.1 As the negative impacts of climate 
change became more apparent, policies related to scientific research were 
given higher priority. Since May 2011, the NIPR has led a nationwide project 
that seeks to integrate the various strands of Japanese scientific research 
related to climate change in the Arctic.2 In addition, since Japan made the 
 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “Hokkyoku: Kanosei to kadai no motarasu mirai”  
[The Arctic: The Future Arising from the Opportunities and Challenges], December 25, 2013  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/pr/wakaru/topics/vol107.
 2 National Institute of Polar Research, “To the Arctic...Where You Can See the Future of the Earth,” 
October 2011  http://www.nipr.ac.jp/grene/doc/grene_E.pdf.
aki tonami  is a Researcher at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) at the University of 
Copenhagen in Denmark. She can be reached at <aki.tonami@nias.ku.dk>.
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decision to prioritize becoming an observer in the Arctic Council, the region 
has gained a certain level of political momentum and Japan’s Arctic policies 
have started to gather pace and shape. For instance, just before the council’s 
decision, an Arctic ambassador was assigned by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) in March 2013, and the Arctic was included in the central 
government’s new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, published in April 2013.3 
This greater focus on the Arctic can be partly attributed to a stronger 
lobby from the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF). OPRF is 
a think tank and lobbying organization for the Japanese shipping and 
manufacturing industries and has conducted several research projects on 
the Arctic, especially regarding the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Guided 
by the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, a new interministerial committee on 
the Arctic (called Hokkyokukai Ni Kakaru Shomondai Ni Taisuru Kankei 
Shocho Renraku Kaigi, or the Liaison Committee among Ministries and 
Agencies on Various Issues Related to the Arctic) was set up in July 2013. The 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)—one of 
the more proactive and powerful ministries of Japan—has also shown an 
interest in the Arctic. In 2013, MLIT conducted a small project to study 
the practical legal implications of using the NSR along the Russian coast, 
with a view toward developing the sea route further. More recently, in 
January 2014, OPRF began collaborating with MLIT and the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) on a new 
project to specifically consider the construction of a new icebreaker for 
Arctic observations.4
Japan’s Reasons for Joining the Arctic Council
Japan’s decision to apply for observer status on the Arctic Council came 
at a time when the council was beginning to take on new responsibilities. 
As the Arctic region underwent climate changes, the council’s adoption of 
new roles related to safety of navigation and search and rescue was taken 
as an indication that the council itself was changing and that the positions 
of member states were shifting.5 The council is the only formal mechanism 
in the Arctic similar to the Antarctic Treaty System. As a major maritime 
 3 Cabinet Office (Japan), “Kaiyo kihon keikaku” [Basic Plan on Ocean Policy], April 2013.
 4 “Hokkyoku kansokusen, seifu ga shinzo kento koro katsuyo, deokure bankai” [The Government 
Considers Building a New Arctic Observation Ship: Catch Up on Using the Sea Route], Sankei Shimbun, 
January 26, 2014  http://sankei.jp.msn.com/life/news/140126/trd14012614110012-n1.htm.
 5 Author’s interview with an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, February 17, 2012.
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nation with a long history of polar research, Japan could not overlook the 
importance of participation in formal discussions regarding the Arctic. 
At the same time, Tokyo recognized that it did not have a legal basis to 
participate in such discussions other than through the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Until it was able to gain 
observer status, Japan regarded it as important to at least be a part of the 
decision-making process and contribute to ongoing scientific research and 
the development of resources, sea routes, trade, and technology related to 
the Arctic.6 
This decision was not motivated by immediate security threats or 
economic interests. Japan judged that the potential for security problems 
in the Arctic is minimal, unless relations between China and Russia or 
Russia and the United States become severely strained.7 Hence, it was 
not particularly concerned that the council does not have a mandate to 
discuss national or international security matters. Moreover, based on 
previous research findings from OPRF, the Japanese shipping industry had 
concluded long before that any benefits from developing the NSR were too 
fragile to present significant financial or logistical advantages over existing 
routes. Instead, Japan regarded its decision to join the Arctic Council and 
collaborate with Arctic states on research and development as a step to 
secure future rather than present interests.8
Japan’s Contributions to the Arctic Council
In Japan’s view, scientific research is what it does best as a technologically 
advanced industrial nation. Japan also believes that this is what the Arctic 
Council expects it to do. The natural environment of the Arctic is fragile 
and requires large-scale, costly research in order to understand the possible 
repercussions of climate change. In terms of capacity at present, Japan owns 
three icebreakers, but only the Shirase possesses the capacity to be used as 
an icebreaker for Arctic expeditions. However, the Shirase is operated by the 
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and under current law can only be used 
as a supply vessel for the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition (JARE).9 
 6 Author’s interview with Tetsuo Kotani, Tokyo, November 6, 2012.
 7 Author’s interview with researchers at the National Institute of Defense Studies, Tokyo,  
October 22, 2012.
 8 Aki Tonami and Stewart Watters, “Japan’s Arctic Policy: The Sum of Many Parts,” in Arctic Yearbook 
2012, ed. Lassi Heininen (Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2012).
 9 For more details, see ibid.
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The purpose of the ongoing discussion between OPRF, MEXT, and MLIT 
on building an Arctic-specific icebreaker is to overcome this legal restriction 
in order to further promote Japan’s Arctic scientific research. The Arctic 
ambassador, Toshio Kunikata, mentioned in his presentation at the Arctic 
Frontiers conference in 2014 that Japan, as a maritime nation surrounded by 
water, could additionally contribute its expertise to the search-and-rescue 
efforts of the member states of the Arctic Council. 
Japan could also take the lead in promoting intra-Asia cooperation 
on the Arctic, which would benefit both the member states of the Arctic 
Council and the five new Asian observers. This initiative would save the 
member states time and effort, as there would be less need for them to have 
separate bilateral relations on the Arctic with each of the Asian states. All 
Asian observers, particularly the three East Asian states (China, Japan, 
and South Korea), would greatly benefit from cooperating with each 
other to develop the ports and necessary infrastructure to make the NSR 
a functioning reality. Although for the time being historical grievances, 
territorial disputes, and mutual suspicion are hindering the prospects 
for such cooperation, the Arctic Council gives Japan and other Asian 
countries a forum in which to meet and informally discuss opportunities 
for Arctic cooperation.
Building Greater Cooperation  
with China, Russia, and the United States
China. The consensus among Japanese scientists and business people 
engaged in the Arctic is that cooperation with China is important given 
the limits on what Japan can accomplish by itself. Interactions among 
scientists from the two countries already occur at academic conferences 
as well as during Antarctic expeditions, as both the Chinese and Japanese 
polar research centers have stations in Antarctica.10 One Japanese scholar 
has pointed out that in order for the NSR to be truly effective, port facilities 
need to be improved in order to provide refuge to ships during emergency 
situations, both a search-and-rescue system and the infrastructure for it 
must be further developed, and hydrographic charts must be updated.11 
Given the cost of all three of these measures, the Chinese and Japanese 
shipping industries recognize that further cooperation would definitely 
 10 Author’s interview with a professor at the Polar Research Institute of China, Shanghai, June 5, 2013.
 11 Natsuhiko Otsuka, “Will the Northern Sea Route See a Bright Future?” (lecture at the Nordic 
Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen, January 27, 2014).
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benefit both sides. As mentioned earlier, however, political tension and 
mistrust between the two countries hinder scientific and commercial 
cooperation. Both the Chinese and Japanese media and governments are 
keenly aware of each other’s Arctic-related activities, as if to compete against 
each other.12
Russia and the United States. Japanese experts are divided on whether 
Russia or the United States is the best partner for Japan in the Arctic arena. 
For example, OPRF believes that Russia is the most important stakeholder 
for Japan’s engagement in the Arctic. Among its nine specific policy 
recommendations made in 2012 regarding the Arctic, OPRF suggested that 
the government set up a formal mechanism for the two countries to discuss 
Arctic affairs.13 However, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), 
which is one of the most influential Japanese think tanks and has strong 
links to MOFA, argued differently. In its policy recommendations released 
in 2012, JIIA emphasized the promotion of peaceful and stable Arctic 
governance based on the international order but nonetheless recommended 
that Japan-U.S. cooperation be strengthened, particularly in terms of 
security, considering possible changes to the strategic environment.14 
Despite these conflicting opinions among stakeholders, until the 
Ukraine crisis it appeared that Japan leaned more toward Russia than the 
United States as an Arctic partner. This view was supported by several 
factors. First, Moscow has made developing its isolated eastern territories, 
especially the Russian Far East, a high national priority, thereby increasing 
its eagerness to engage in joint development projects with countries like 
Japan.15 Second, since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe returned to power in 
2012, he has prioritized the bilateral relationship between Japan and Russia. 
As Yoko Hirose has noted, this is the result of a shift in Japanese foreign 
policy toward “value-based diplomacy” (kachikan gaiko), which itself is 
based on the U.S.-Japan alliance and the concept of the “arc of freedom 
 12 See “Riben sheli zhu Beiji dashi, ni tigao zai Beiji ‘cunzai gan’ ” [Japan Assigns the Arctic 
Ambassador: To Increase the “Presence” in the Arctic], Huanqiu, March 19, 2013  http://
world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2013-03/3747218.html; and Okazaki Kenkyujo, “Hokkyokuken 
ni okeru Chugoku no omowaku” [China’s Calculation in the Arctic] http://wedge.ismedia.jp/
articles/-/2903.
 13 Ocean Policy Research Foundation, “Hokkyokukai no jizokukano na riyo ni muke Nippon 
ga tadachi ni okonaubeki sesaku” [Policies That Japan Should Implement Immediately for the 
Sustainable Use of the Arctic], 2012.
 14 Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), “Hokkyoku no gabanansu to Nippon no gaiko 
senryaku” [The Arctic Governance and Japan’s Diplomatic Strategy], 2012, 98.
 15 Rensselaer Lee, “The Russian Far East: Opportunities and Challenges for Russia’s Window on the 
Pacific,” Orbis 57, no. 2 (2013): 314–24.
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and prosperity” from the first Abe administration (2006–7).16 Russia is 
considered to be within this arc. Third, Tokyo has a clear motive to work 
with Moscow to increase gas imports as Japan became more dependent on 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 
and the subsequent nationwide shutdown of nuclear power plants.17 Finally, 
the U.S. approach to the Arctic is viewed in Japan as being mostly centered 
on achieving security rather than commercial goals, the latter of which 
Japan regards as more relevant.18
Challenges Confronting Japan as  
It Attempts to Interact in the Arctic
Against this backdrop, the recent illegal annexation of Crimea by 
Russia has placed Japan in a difficult position, especially in light of the 
positive relationship between Putin and Abe. Their closeness is considered 
exceptional, given the fact that Japan has a long-standing territorial 
dispute with Russia and no peace treaty was reached between the two 
countries following the end of World War II.19 Business development in the 
Russian Arctic is one of the few areas where both countries could benefit 
from furthering their relationship. Therefore, finding the right level of 
cooperation with Russia, while maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance and 
fulfilling its obligations as a member of the group of seven (G-7), will be 
a difficult balancing act for Japan. In the meantime, despite the divisions 
over Ukraine, there are signs that Japan is attempting to promote 
commercial cooperation in the Arctic with Russia while avoiding giving 
offense to the United States. For example, the Japan-Finland Business 
Forum, which promoted Finland as a “center of Europe and gateway to 
Russia,” was held in Helsinki and St. Petersburg in May 2014, backed by 
the Finnish and Japanese governments.
In addition to pursuing cooperation with Russia in the Arctic, as 
mentioned earlier, it would be beneficial for Japan to improve trilateral 
cooperation with China and South Korea in dealing with the Arctic Council. 
 16 Yoko Hirose, “Abe seiken no Roshia, kyu Soren chiiki no gaiko seisaku” [The Abe Administration’s 
Dipmatic Policy Toward Russia and the Former Soviet Region], Synodos, August 6, 2013  http://
synodos.jp/international/5124.
 17 Atle Staalesen, “French, Japanese Technology for Yamal LNG,” Barents Observer, April 3, 2013 
http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2013/04/french-japanese-technology-yamal-lng-03-04.
 18 JIIA, “Hokkyoku no gabanansu to Nippon no gaiko senryaku,” 85.




Although China and South Korea are more eager than Japan to develop the 
NSR and natural resources in the Arctic, the three countries share concerns 
regarding navigation rights. China and South Korea have already made a 
bilateral research agreement regarding the Arctic. As important as Russia 
and the United States are for Japan’s engagement in the Arctic, it would be 
unwise for Japan to ignore the opportunity this presents. Overcoming the 
political tension and mistrust with both China and South Korea will thus be 
key for Japan to achieve its goals in the Arctic. 
